Photo from http://gelsantosrelos.typepad.com with thanksOvernight on 11th February, the outpouring of comments on facebook were either jubilant (e.g. Magandang umaga, Egypt!) or apprehensive (e.g. Hold your horses if you think tonight that Egypt will suddenly turn into a modern democracy and an advanced economy). After 18 days of popular protest against his regime, Hosni Mubarak stepped down as Egypt's president of the last 30 years. On TV, news anchors pronounced Mubarak's ouster as a triumph of 'people power'.
That reference has a historical connection to us Filipinos, having been coined to describe the culmination of protests that started with the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983, and ended with: a four-day demonstration along Edsa in 1986; a US Navy/Airforce airlift of Ferdinand Marcos and his family to exile in Hawaii on 25th February 25 years ago; and, the swearing-in of Corazon Aquino as President. Martial Law babies like myself watch Egyptians, as well as the Tunisians, Jordanians, Yemenis and others, celebrate Mubarak's departure with wistful nostalgia for 1986.
Democracy is a process and outcome of continuous struggle to protect individual freedoms and human dignity; it is a struggle that never ends, even in more mature democratic political systems. We have had several people-powerish experiences since Edsa, such as the 1997 anti-Cha Cha rallies against changing presidential term limits as well as the 2001 EDSA Dos protests that overthrew Joseph Estrada when the impeachment process in the Senate failed.
There are no oppressors where there are no oppressed; and what we see on our screens today is an oppressed people realizing this. Liberation is possible simply by voting on their feet--without violence. That's a one-of-a-kind, pure shot of empowerment; and that's what Tahrir and EDSA have in common.
The comparison ends there, however.
The jarring element in the story of Egypt is the unqualified welcome given by Egyptians themselves to the military as caretaker. Mohamad ElBaradei has furthermore publicly stated that an election could take place in as long as a year from now. In contrast, 25 years ago in the Philippines, then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos defected from the Marcos dictatorship when rumors of a purge in the military threatened them. It was Cory Aquino and, Cardinal Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Sin who raised the call for people to come into the streets and also to protect Ramos and Enrile by forming a human barricade around them. Thus the military, complicit in perpetrating human rights violations in the name of counter-insurgency and national interest under Marcos, was relegated a secondary role under civilian authority from the outset. And somehow, Cory weathered the seven coup d'etat attempts throughout the six years of her administration.
This brings me to a second and related point. There is as yet no clear civilian figurehead to lead Egypt through this political transition. ElBaradei is internationally-respected as the three-term Director-General International Atomic Energy Agency head until 2009; since his departure from that office, he was moreover an early voice for Egypt's democratization, and enjoys real distance from the Mubarak regime. But domestically, he is not well known. Then there is the face of the online youth upswelling in this revolution, Wael Ghonim, who has not yet expressed interest in entering politics.
Viewed with great distrust by Israel and the Americans, the Muslim Brotherhood party-- outlawed by Mubarak--may stand the best chance of winning a snap election should there be one. Unlike the social movement that seemed to mushroom out of nowhere, they are organized and reach far outside Cairo.
Perhaps others might emerge. But they will still have the military to deal with. They do not have a Cory Aquino who, as a "plain housewife" and Ninoy's widow, had both the perceived moral ascendancy (backed by the people) and a machinery (backed by a united opposition party) needed to lead the messy transformation toward democracy.
Thirdly: unlike Egypt, the uprising in the Philippines took place after Cory Aquino had won a snap election against Marcos. Cory therefore had the legitimacy to lead; the popular revolt was sparked precisely by Marcos' attempt to steal the choice of leadership away from voters. In a vote marked by intimidation and cheating, many public school teachers, church workers, Commission on Election personnel, NAMFREL election observers and other citizens guarded ballots valiantly. They were Edsa's early heroes and foreshadowed the upheaval that was to come.
Fourth, the Philippine economy had already been decimated and plundered by the Marcoses and the cronies by '86, digging a deep hole out of which we haven't yet to managed to climb. Already by the end of week 1 of the Egypt crisis, economists were already making dire pronouncements that economic collapse would be deep-set and irreversible within days. Egypt, unlike its neighbors does not capitalize on oil but tourism, and had been at an economic standstill for almost three weeks. They are more dependent on a globalized economy than we were in the '80s, and recovery will be more complex.
Finally, the largest complication for Egypt is its delicate position in the dynamics of peace and conflict in the Middle East. Egypt was the first of only two Arab countries to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Egypt also controls access to the Gaza Strip on its Rafah border, although it has partially opened access since last June following the Gaza flotilla incident. Egypt has long been a lever of American and Western influence in the Middle East. In contrast, the eventual closure of the US bases in the Philippines (one key issue that pitted the Senate and civil society against the Aquino government in '92) did not result in devastating consequences for security in the region.
Still, there is cause for celebration. There are dangers to be wary of, yes, but from one more Filipino: Magandang umaga, Egypt. Magandang araw sa inyong lahat.
